Over the past decade, China has profoundly expanded its control over Africa’s mineral resources. Through a calculated blend of investment, long-term offtake agreements, infrastructure-for-resources deals, and diplomatic influence, Beijing has secured access to the building blocks of the modern green economy at a scale unmatched by any other external actor. This strategy has reshaped the political economy of mining in Africa and raised pressing questions about governance, sustainability, and equitable development.
Historical Foundations and Strategic Evolution
China’s resource engagement in Africa is not a recent phenomenon. Dating back to the Cold War, Beijing forged ideological and political ties with liberation movements across the continent, most notably in Tanzania, Zambia, and Angola. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA), financed and built by China in the 1970s, stands as an early symbol of Sino-African cooperation. These historic ties have laid the foundation for the more transactional, resource-centered relationships of the 21st century.
In the early 2000s, as China industrialized at breakneck speed, its demand for raw materials surged. African nations, rich in untapped reserves of copper, cobalt, bauxite, lithium, and rare earths, became a focal point. The Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), launched in 2000, institutionalized these ties and enabled a coordinated strategy that aligns commercial imperatives with diplomatic outreach.
Equity Ownership in Key Mining Assets
Chinese state-owned and private enterprises have methodically acquired substantial stakes in some of Africa’s most valuable mining operations, particularly in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Zambia, Zimbabwe, and Guinea. These countries hold vast reserves of critical minerals like cobalt, copper, and bauxite. In the DRC, the Sicomines project exemplifies this approach. Structured as a joint venture between Chinese firms and Gécamines, the Congolese state mining company, Sicomines grants China a 68% ownership share in exchange for billions of dollars in infrastructure investments.
This model allows China to bypass the political conditionalities typically imposed by Western lenders, such as environmental assessments or transparency obligations. While the speed and scale of Chinese investment have enabled rapid project rollouts, they have also sidelined local governance mechanisms, exacerbated corruption risks, and limited host countries' leverage over their own resources.
Long-Term Off-take Agreements
A core element of China's mineral control strategy is its extensive use of long-term off-take agreements. These contracts guarantee a stable, long-term supply of critical minerals such as cobalt, lithium, and rare earths - essential inputs for electric vehicle production, electronics, and renewable energy infrastructure. In return, China often promises infrastructure development, concessional loans, or direct financial assistance.
Such agreements can be deeply binding. Host countries often lack the technical capacity to assess the long-term implications of these deals or the leverage to renegotiate them once signed. This dynamic creates asymmetrical trade relationships that can persist for decades, locking African states into supply roles with limited capacity for downstream development or value retention.
Infrastructure-for-Resources Deals
China has mastered the art of infrastructure-for-resources deals - "barter-style" arrangements that appeal to resource-rich but capital-poor nations. Angola’s oil-backed loan arrangements and the DRC’s resource-financed infrastructure projects are leading examples. According to the China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI), Beijing has committed over $155 billion to infrastructure projects in Africa since 2000.
These arrangements can deliver roads, hospitals, power plants, and ports in record time, fulfilling pressing development needs. However, they often obscure the real cost of the minerals exchanged, making it difficult for host nations to track value for money or conduct accurate debt sustainability analyses. Critics argue that these opaque deals can lead to exploitative outcomes and perpetuate neocolonial economic structures.
Vertical Integration and Processing Power
In contrast to many Western firms that concentrate on extraction, Chinese companies follow a vertically integrated model that encompasses extraction, refining, and manufacturing. Nowhere is this more evident than in the DRC, where Chinese companies control approximately 80% of cobalt refining capacity.
This control over processing means that African countries miss out on higher-value industrial activities and remain trapped in low-margin extractive roles. According to the World Bank, Africa loses up to 70% of potential export value due to limited domestic mineral processing capacity. China's dominance in refining not only reinforces its control over supply chains but also curtails African efforts to develop industrial clusters and local employment opportunities.
Diplomatic Leverage and Soft Power
Economic dominance is only part of the equation. China has paired its commercial presence with strategic diplomacy and soft power. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has extended Chinese influence into over 40 African nations, embedding Beijing in national infrastructure and development agendas. China provides scholarships, technical training, and political support to African leaders, often avoiding governance conditionalities tied to Western aid.
Confucius Institutes and state-backed media outlets project favorable narratives of China-Africa cooperation, while infrastructure projects serve as highly visible symbols of partnership. These mechanisms allow China to shape elite opinion, manage public sentiment, and influence policymaking without resorting to direct political intervention.
Key Minerals Targeted by China in Africa
Governance, Human Rights, and Environmental Concerns
Concerns about Chinese investments in Africa are less about sovereignty per se and more about governance, accountability, and human rights. Critics argue that Chinese firms often operate with minimal transparency, weak labor protections, and poor environmental compliance. In Zambia, there have been multiple worker protests over safety violations. In Guinea, bauxite mining has triggered widespread deforestation and displacement.
These issues are compounded by the lack of institutional capacity in many African states to enforce regulations. The opaque nature of contracts, coupled with limited civil society oversight, makes it difficult to hold actors accountable or ensure equitable distribution of benefits. This dynamic risks reinforcing elite capture, whereby political and business elites extract rents while broader societal development is neglected.
Global Implications and Strategic Response
China’s dominance over critical mineral supply chains poses a geopolitical challenge. Western governments have responded with new initiatives like the U.S.-led Mineral Security Partnership and the EU’s Global Gateway, but these efforts remain underfunded and fragmented.
As the energy transition accelerates, secure access to cobalt, lithium, and rare earths is becoming a strategic imperative. Yet China’s head start, anchored in a two-decade strategy, means it will remain a dominant force unless rival powers invest in more coordinated, long-term, and locally responsive approaches.
Conclusion: Toward a New Mineral Compact
China’s strategic control over Africa’s mineral resources has yielded both development dividends and deep asymmetries. While infrastructure has improved and mining output has surged, African economies remain vulnerable to external shocks, limited in value addition, and constrained by asymmetric partnerships.
To ensure that mineral wealth translates into sustainable development, African nations must prioritize governance reform, invest in local processing capabilities, and diversify their partnerships beyond any single power. Civil society must be empowered to scrutinize contracts and demand greater accountability. The next decade will be decisive: either Africa will harness the mineral boom to build inclusive growth, or it will replicate the extractive dependency cycles of the past.
About the Author
Michael Skapoullis holds a BSc in Economics from City University of London and an MBA from INSEAD. He is a results-driven entrepreneur and business strategist with over 15 years of experience in the resource and mining sector across Africa. With proven expertise in project development, operations management, and stakeholder engagement, he has a strong track record of driving sustainable growth and building cross-sector partnerships that promote responsible resource extraction across the continent.